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ORIGIN AF-01

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INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001R

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 318663

FOR CHARGE FROM AF/C - MCCULLEY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: AMGT
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

SECURITY IN THE EAST:

2. I ATTENDED A BRIEFING LAST WEDNESDAY GIVEN BY TWO DS OFFICERS WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM EASTERN ZAIRE. JOHN BEAUDRY AND RUSSEL ROSS PROVIDED A COGENT (IF NONE TOO SURPRISING) REVIEW OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CAMPS. AS CLAUDE RAINS SAID IN "CASABLANCA," I WAS
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"SHOCKED" TO LEARN THAT REFUGEES LIVE IN DEPLORABLE CONDITIONS AND THE EXTREMISTS HAVE SEIZED CONTROL OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF. ROSS AND BEAUDRY WERE LESS THAN IMPRESSED WITH THE UNHCR/NGO EVACUATION PLAN IN THE EVENT OF A REFUGEE UPRISING (OR AN UPSURGE IN INCIDENTS LIKE THE RECENT BLOW-UP IN KATALE), AND WANTED TO INTEGRATE THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE SECURITY SITUATION WITH U.S. CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON EVACUATION OF AMERICANS/EXPATS.

3. I SUGGESTED THAT ENOUGH FOLK WERE ALREADY WORKING ON THE SECURITY IN THE CAMPS ISSUE, AND THAT WE SHOULD RATHER PROCEED WITH CONTINGENCY EVACUATION PLANNING AS AN ADJUNCT TO KINSHASA'S EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN (COORDINATED

WITH KIGALI AND BUJ AS THE OBVIOUS UNCLASSIFIED (POINTS).
I NOTED THAT DALE WAS IN THE AREA ON AN AMCIT ASSESSMENT
TRIP, AND THAT KINSHASA HAD ALREADY PUT IN A REQUEST FOR
TDY CONSULAR SUPPORT. IF DS INSISTED ON AN EVAC PLAN FOR
EASTERN ZAIRE, IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE TO SEND A CONSULAR
OFFICER AND A DS AGENT TDY TO ZAIRE FOR A COUPLE OF WEEKS
TO FOLLOW ON THE WORK DALE HAS ALREADY DONE, AND TO
ASSIST THE EMBASSY IN UPDATING THIS SECTION OF THE EAC.
MANY AROUND THE TABLE NOTED THAT WHATEVER WORK WAS DONE
WOULD PERFORCE BE A SNAPSHOT OF THE AMCIT SITUATION IN
THE EAST. AS DALE'S CABLE POINTED OUT, THE TRANSIENT
EXPAT POPULATION IS VERY MOBILE, AND THE LONG-TERM
RESIDENTS WOULD LIKELY WANT TO RIDE OUT WHATEVER STORM IS
BREWING.

RETRAINING THE FAZ: A MULTI-CREDIT COURSE
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4. HANK COHEN CALLED MONDAY TO ADVISE THAT HIS
ASSOCIATE, FORMER DASD JIM WOODS, PLANNED TO TRAVEL TO
ZAIRE THIS WEEK TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FAZ HIGH
COMMAND AND THE DEFENSE MINISTRY ON RETRAINING THE
ZAIRIAN MILITARY. HANK SAID THAT DURING HIS OWN RECENT
TRIP TO ZAIRE, HE HAD SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME WITH
ELUKI, AND IT SEEMS THE FAZ OFFICER CORPS WANTS TRAINING
ON THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN A DEMOCRACY. HANK WANTED
TO BE SURE THAT THE USG HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE TRIP, AND
SAID THAT WOODS WOULD MAKE CERTAIN HIS ZAIRIAN
INTERLOCUTORS UNDERSTOOD THIS TO BE A PRIVATE/PRIVATE
AMERICAN INITIATIVE. I BRIEFED A/S MOOSE ON THE PLAN,
AND GEM SAID THAT "HANK AND JIM SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED" IN
THEIR EFFORTS. WOODS SHOULD ARRIVE IN KINSHASA O/A
NOVEMBER 30, AND WILL CONTACT YOU TO BRIEF ON HIS
DISCUSSIONS.

ME. MUKENDI: THE REASONABLE FACE OF THE UDPS

5. MAITRE MUKENDI CHECKED IN A FEW DAYS AGO IN AF/C AT
THE END OF HIS USIS IV PROGRAM. HE WAS QUITE PLEASED
WITH HIS PROGRAM. MUKENDI WENT OVER MANY OF THE SAME
POINTS FROM HIS OCTOBER MEETING WITH REED (REPORTED IN A
FRONT CHANNEL), AND STRESSED THAT, DESPITE UDPS
DIFFICULTIES WITH U.S. POLICY, THE PARTY FELT THE U.S. TO

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BE AN ALLY AND WISHED TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE. MUKENDI
SAID THAT HE WOULD ARGUE THE UDPS CASE ON THE LEGITIMACY
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OF KENGO'S ELECTION BEFORE ZAIRE'S HIGH COURT SOON AFTER
HIS RETURN, AND HE PRESSED FOR THE U.S. POSITION SHOULD
THE COURT RULE AGAINST KENGO. I WAS NON-COMMITTAL.
MUKENDI WAS RELAXED AND ENGAGING, AND I WAS RELIEVED THAT
HE CHOSE NOT TO BRING ALONG THE CONFRONTATIONAL ZEALOTS
FROM ZAIRE NETWORK. I UNDERSTAND FROM A COLLEAGUE ON THE
ITALY DESK THAT THE UDPS HAS ASKED TO MEET WITH THE
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN ROME. SUSPECT THAT THIS IS
LAMBERT MENDE, ON THE SOUTHERN LEG OF HIS "TRUTH SQUAD"
BOONDOGGLE. WHOEVER IT IS, THEY WILL LIKELY SEE A SECOND
SECRETARY; I PROVIDED SOME BACKGROUND INFO ON THE U.S.
PARTY LINE ON ZAIRE.

SECURITY IN THE CAMPS: PART DEUX

6. THE FRIENDS OF RWANDA REPORTING CABLE IS WENDING ITS
WAY UP TO THE SEVENTH FLOOR. U/S WIRTH WANTED A SHORT
SUMMARY OF THE DAY'S EVENTS, BUT GIVEN THE REQUIRED
CLEARANCES BY FIVE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES, IT HAS BEEN
DELAYED A BIT. THOUGHT YOU MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN A BLOW
BY BLOW ACCOUNT OF THE SECURITY IN THE CAMPS SECTION OF
THE MEETING. KEEP IN MIND THAT THIS WILL NOT SEE THE
LIGHT OF DAY IN A FRONT CHANNEL, AND HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED
BEYOND THE DOOR OF MY OFFICE.

BEGIN TEXT:

SUMMARY

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2. UNDERSECRETARY FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS TIM WIRTH CHAIRED
AN ALL-DAY SESSION ON NOVEMBER 22 OF THE RWANDA
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP ("FRIENDS OF RWANDA") TO
ADDRESS A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES ATTENDANT TO THE CRISIS IN
CENTRAL AFRICA. IN ADDITION TO THE UNITED STATES, EIGHT
COUNTRIES AND THE UN AND EUROPEAN UNION SENT HIGH-RANKING
DELEGATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSIONS. FRANCE

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DECLINED TO PARTICIPATE, BUT SENT OBSERVERS TO THEIR EMBASSY. THE SESSION OPENED WITH A DISCUSSION OF PERHAPS THE MOST INTRACTABLE ISSUE: SECURITY IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN EASTERN ZAIRE. THE CONFERENCE CONTINUED WITH SEGMENTS ON UN AND BILATERAL COORDINATION, PREPARATIONS FOR A REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY, ASSISTANCE TO THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT, AND EFFORTS AT POLITICAL RECONCILIATION. THE PARTICIPANTS AGREED TO MEET AGAIN IN DECEMBER IN NEW YORK TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE. END SUMMARY.

U.S. OPENING

3. IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH UNDERLINED THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT SEE THE "FRIENDS OF RWANDA" MECHANISM AS A CONTACT GROUP NOR AS A POLITICAL PRESSURE GROUP. WIRTH SAID THAT POLITICAL DECISIONS ON RESOLVING THE CRISIS IN CENTRAL AFRICA WOULD BE MADE ELSEWHERE, AND PARTICULARLY BY THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. THE FORMAL TITLE OF THE "FRIENDS," THE

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RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP (ROSG), WAS INTENDED TO CONVEY THAT THE BODY WOULD SUPPORT THE UN, THE OAU, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN EFFORTS TO BRING STABILITY TO THE REGION. WIRTH EMPHASIZED THAT THE COMPLEX SERIES OF PROBLEMS FACING THE REGION MUST BE HANDLED IN A COORDINATED FASHION. HE NOTED THAT THE BELGIANS HAD PUT A "CONSTRUCTIVE PAPER" ON THE TABLE TO ADDRESS THE RANGE OF PROBLEMS, AND ASKED THE DELEGATIONS TO REVIEW AND COMMENT. WIRTH INVITED SHORT OPENING REMARKS BY THE DELEGATION HEADS, AND THEN ASKED UN UNDER SECRETARY FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS PETER HANSEN TO BRIEF THE CONFERENCE ON THE REPORT RELEASED LAST WEEK BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE SECURITY IN THE RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE.

THREE DELEGATIONS RESPOND

4. THE FRENCH, WHO HAD REFUSED AN INVITATION TO SEND A DELEGATION TO THE SESSION, WERE NONETHELESS REPRESENTED BY THEIR DCM AND AFRICA WATCHER FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. THE FRENCH OBSERVER NOTED IN HIS OPENING REMARKS THAT FRANCE BELIEVED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL

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COMMUNITY MUST ACT QUICKLY AND SHOULD COORDINATE UNCLASSIFIED
EFFORTS. NONE OF THE PROBLEMS IN THE REGION COULD BE
RESOLVED INDEPENDENTLY; RATHER THE SITUATION ARGUED FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UN AND THE
OAU. THE BELGIANS, REPRESENTED BY MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS FRANS VAN DAELE, AGREED ON THE NEED
FOR A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, BUT ARGUED THAT A FIRST,
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DOABLE STEP MIGHT BE TO FOCUS ON THE VOLUNTARY
REPATRIATION OF RWANDAN REFUGEES FROM BURUNDI. THE
BELGIANS ALSO ASKED FOR THE ADDITION OF AN AGENDA ITEM ON
ORGANIZATION OF FUTURE MEETINGS, THE VENUE AND
PARTICIPANTS. THE HEAD OF THE TUNISIAN DELEGATION NOTED
DRYLY THAT HE REPRESENTED THE ONLY AFRICAN COUNTRY AT THE
TABLE. HE SAID THAT TUNISIA SUPPORTED THE LEADING ROLE
OF THE UN IN RESOLVING THE CRISIS, BUT SUGGESTED THAT THE
OAU WOULD PLAY A PART, "ACCORDING TO ITS MEANS." HE
URGED THAT COUNTRIES FROM THE REGION PARTICIPATE IN
FUTURE SESSIONS.

SECURITY IN THE CAMPS - THE SYG'S REPORT

5. IN HIS PRESENTATION ON THE SYG'S REPORT ON THE
SITUATION IN THE RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS, U/SYG HANSEN
EMPHASIZED THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE RANGE OF PROBLEMS.
HE NOTED THAT IT WAS MEANINGLESS TO TALK ABOUT THE
REFUGEE CAMPS WITHOUT FACTORING IN THE PROBLEMS OF THE
INTERNALLY DISPLACED; THAT IT MADE NO SENSE TO ADDRESS
THE DISPLACED WITHOUT LOOKING AT CONDITIONS WITHIN
RWANDA. HANSEN URGED THAT THE PRINCIPAL GOAL FOR THE
"FRIENDS OF RWANDA" SHOULD BE THE AMELIORATION OF
CONDITIONS WITHIN RWANDA IN ORDER TO CREATE AN
APPROPRIATE CLIMATE TO ENCOURAGE THE VOLUNTARY
REPATRIATION OF THE REFUGEES. THE SYG'S REPORT,
ACCORDING TO HANSEN, OFFERED A RANGE OF OPTIONS FROM
ASSISTANCE TO THE ZAIRIAN POLICE TO THE DISPATCH OF A
10,000 TO 12,000 MAN UN FORCE TO SEPARATE THE MILITIA AND
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THE FORMER RWANDAN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY FROM THE MAIN
BODY OF REFUGEES. HANSEN SAID THAT EXCISING THE
EXTREMIST ELEMENTS WOULD FREE THE CIVILIAN REFUGEE
POPULATION FROM THE "TOTALITARIAN REIGN OF TERROR." IN

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BETWEEN THESE EXTREME OPTIONS, THE UNCLASSIFIED
CONTEMPLATED OTHER MEASURES, INCLUDING A SMALLER FORCE OF
2,000 TO 4,000 TO PROVIDE MINIMUM SECURITY IN THE CAMPS
AND OFFER A SAFE CORRIDOR FOR THOSE REFUGEES WHO WISHED
TO RETURN.

6. GENERAL JOSEPH BARIL, MILITARY ADVISOR THE UN DPKO,
CONTINUED WITH A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE ON THE SYG'S
REPORT. BARIL SAID THAT THE FORMER RWANDAN ARMY (EX-FAR)
WAS A "BEATEN UP" FORCE, BUT THAT IT "WAS NOT TOO BEATEN
UP," AND THAT IT MAINTAINED A FORCE LEVEL OF 20,000 MEN.
BARIL SAID THAT EX-FAR WAS "DANGEROUS, STILL WELL-ARMED,
WELL FED," AND WAS INCREASING ITS CAPABILITY ALL THE
TIME. BARIL SAID THAT UNAMIR, WITH A FORCE OF 5,500
COULD SURVIVE "IN THE HEART OF AFRICA," BUT COULD NOT BE
EXPECTED TO TACKLE THE EX-FAR. BARIL SUGGESTED, HOWEVER,
THAT UNAMIR "COULD ACT AS THE ANCHOR" FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL FORCE WHICH MIGHT CROSS INTO ZAIRE NORTH
AND SOUTH OF LAKE KIVU. BARIL OPINED THAT IT WOULD TAKE
FIVE YEARS TO PUT A PEACEKEEPING FORCE OF 12,000 MEN INTO
THE FIELD, "IN THE NORMAL UN WAY," AND THAT IN THE
INTERIM, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDED AN IMMEDIATE
SOLUTION. BARIL SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH THE UN
ASSESSMENT ON THE NEED FOR SOME TYPE OF INTERNATIONAL
FORCE, AND THAT THE OPERATION WOULD REQUIRE THE CONSENT
OF THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT, AND THE ASSISTANCE OF THE
ZAIRIAN ARMY. THE FORCE MUST ASSURE THE SECURITY OF THE
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INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORT, THE SAFE DELIVERY OF
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND THE SAFE PASSAGE OF REFUGEES
WHO WISHED TO RETURN TO RWANDA. UNAMIR, HE SAID, COULD
PROVIDE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AND COMMAND AND CONTROL, BUT
THE NEW FORCE WOULD REQUIRE AN INDEPENDENT MANDATE.

7. CONTINUING, BARIL EXPLAINED THAT THE FIRST PHASE OF
THE OPERATION WOULD INVOLVE A "SPEARHEAD" OF TWO
HIGHLY-TRAINED AND WELL-EQUIPPED UNITS TO GO IN AND
ESTABLISH SECURITY IN THE EX-FAR CAMPS AROUND GOMA AND
BUKAVU. THE FORCE WOULD HAVE ROBUST RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
TO PERMIT IT TO ENFORCE SECURITY, AND THEN WOULD BEGIN TO
IDENTIFY ACCEPTABLE FORMER RWANDAN MILITARY TO TRAIN AND
ASSIST WITH ROUTINE SECURITY IN THE CAMPS. THE UN FORCE
WOULD THEN "LEAPFROG" INTO THE CIVILIAN CAMPS. BARIL
ESTIMATED THAT SUCH AN OPERATION WOULD TAKE AT LEAST TWO
YEARS WITH SUCH A LIMITED FORCE. HE UNDERLINED THAT THE
RWANDAN CRISIS WOULD NOT BE SETTLED BY A MILITARY
SOLUTION; THE UN FORCE MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A POLITICAL

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"REVANCHISM" AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS

8. U.S. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POPULATION, REFUGEES AND MIGRATION PHYLLIS OAKLEY NOTED THAT A TWO YEAR TIMEFRAME PRESENTED NUMEROUS PROBLEMS. WITH A RAPIDLY DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CAMPS, MANY IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FEARED REVANCHIST ATTACKS BY HUTU EXTREMISTS WHICH COULD SPARK RENEWED WARFARE IN

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RWANDA. OAKLEY SAID THAT IF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION WOULD NEED TWO YEARS TO RE-ESTABLISH ORDER IN THE CAMPS, REVANCHISM MIGHT OVERTAKE THIS EFFORT AND VITIATE ANY POSITIVE EFFECTS. BARIL REPLIED THAT THE UN FORCE WOULD BE A "DETERRENT" AND A "STABILIZER" BUT THAT IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW, THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA (GOR) WOULD SOONER OR LATER HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF AMNESTY FOR THE EXTREMISTS. CLEARLY, HE ADMITTED, THE GOR WAS FAR FROM READY TO ENTERTAIN SUCH A DISCUSSION. OAKLEY RETURNED TO THE LENGTHY TIMEFRAME OF THE OPERATION, AND URGED THE UN TO "JUMP START" THE PROCESS. BARIL RESPONDED THAT A JUMP START WAS POSSIBLE ONLY UNDER CHAPTER VII, AND THEN ONLY IF A MEMBER STATE OR GROUP OF MEMBER STATES TOOK THE LEAD IN DEPLOYING THE FORCE.

9. THE FRENCH OBSERVER WELCOMED THE SYG'S REPORT, BUT ASKED WHETHER THE UN HAD YET MADE APPROACHES TO POTENTIAL TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES. HE NOTED THAT OTHER UN OPERATIONS ON THE CONTINENT WERE BEGINNING TO STAND DOWN (IN MOZAMBIQUE, FOR EXAMPLE), AND SUGGESTED THE UN CONSIDER DISCUSSIONS TO ASK COUNTRIES WITH TROOPS ALREADY IN PLACE TO TRANSFER THEM TO CENTRAL AFRICA. U/SYG HANSEN SAID THAT INITIAL APPROACHES HAD BEEN MADE, PARTICULARLY ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO A UN POLICE FORCE IN ZAIRE, BUT THERE WAS "NO ENTHUSIASM SHOWN." HANSEN ADMITTED THAT PROSPECTS WERE NOT ENCOURAGING, AND THAT THE DEPLOYMENT PROBLEMS OF UNAMIR II WERE INSTRUCTIVE. UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH THE CONCEPT OF A FIRST PHASE WITH TWO WELL-EQUIPPED BATTALIONS, BUT ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS A REALISTIC OPTION IF NO COUNTRIES WERE WILLING TO COMMIT TROOPS. IN

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RESPONSE TO A FURTHER QUERY FROM WIRTH, U/SYG HANSEN SAID
THE FIRST OPTION THE UN SHOULD PURSUE MIGHT BE TO
STRENGTHEN THE ZAIRIAN POLICE.

THE BELGIANS LOBBY

10. RETURNING TO THEMES ENUNCIATED IN THEIR
"COMPREHENSIVE" PLAN FOR THE REGION, THE BELGIANS ARGUED
THAT ANY PEACEKEEPING OPERATION MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A
COORDINATED APPROACH COMBINING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
AND A REPATRIATION STRATEGY. INCREASING SECURITY IN THE
REFUGEE CAMPS RISKED "FIXING REFUGEES WHERE THEY ARE,"
AND DID NOT DEAL WITH THE EQUALLY IMPORTANT ISSUE OF HOW
TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO RETURN TO RWANDA. FRANS VAN DAELE,
THE BELGIAN DELEGATION HEAD, SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS
DEEPLY SKEPTICAL THAT A CHAPTER VII OPERATION COULD PASS
MUSTER AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND WAS EQUALLY
PESSIMISTIC THAT COUNTRIES WOULD COME FORWARD TO
CONTRIBUTE WELL-EQUIPPED TROOPS FOR A CHAPTER VI
PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. VAN DAELE SUGGESTED THAT THE UN
SHOULD CONSIDER AFRICAN TROOPS, SUPPORTED, EQUIPPED AND
AIR-LIFTED TO THE REGION BY THE WEST. THE BELGIANS
REMAINED CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT "FRIENDS OF RWANDA"
MOVE BEYOND THE PEACEKEEPING PROBLEM TO CONSIDER WAYS TO
RE-START A DIALOG BETWEEN THE VICTORS AND THE VANQUISHED
IN THE RWANDAN CONFLICT, AND THAT WE SUPPORT MILITARY
REINTEGRATION AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION (PERHAPS USING
UGANDA AS A MODEL).

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11. LATER, BELGIAN MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR GENERAL VAN
DAELE ADDED THAT BRUSSELS HAD INVESTED HEAVILY IN
POLITICAL RECONCILIATION IN BURUNDI, AND THAT THE PROCESS
REMAINED FRAGILE. HE ADMITTED THAT THE MAGNITUDE OF THE
PROBLEM IN THE CAMPS IN ZAIRE WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM, WITH
THE ATTENDANT RISK OF A RENEWED CIVIL WAR. NONETHELESS,
BELGIUM WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT EXCLUSIVE FOCUS ON
ZAIRE WOULD PERMIT THE RELATED PROBLEM OF RWANDAN
REFUGEES IN BURUNDI TO "FESTER," POSING GREAT RISK TO THE
TENUOUS POLITICAL PACT IN BUJUMBURA.

CANADA AND TUNISIA ON REFUGEE RETURN

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11. THE CANADIANS AGREED THAT THERE COULD BE NO LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS WITHOUT THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO RWANDA. CANADA WAS CONCERNED THAT THE REFUGEE PROBLEM COULD CONTINUE "FOR YEARS," AND THAT MORE EFFORT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO COPING WITH THE EXTERNAL CRISIS THAN ADDRESSING THE SITUATION INSIDE THE COUNTRY. THE CANADIANS EMPHASIZED THAT ORGANIZED AND SYSTEMATIC VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION WAS CRUCIAL, AND URGED THAT "WE MUST BE CLEAR ON OUR OBJECTIVES." THE TUNISIANS DESCRIBED THE REFUGEES AS "BETWEEN A HAMMER AND A CLUB," AND VOICED CONCERN THAT THE GOR HAD NOT DONE ENOUGH TO FACILITATE REPATRIATION. THE TUNISIANS SAID THE OAU AGREED ON A TWO TRACK EFFORT: ACTION WITHIN RWANDA TO CREATE CONDITIONS TO ENCOURAGE THE VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES, AND ACTION TO DEAL WITH SECURITY IN THE CAMPS. THEY STRESSED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE MUST

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BE IMPLICATED IN ANY INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IN EASTERN ZAIRE, AND SUGGESTED THAT THE ZAIRIANS MIGHT BE ABLE TO DISARM THE EX-FAR (COMMENT: NOT LIKELY. END COMMENT). THE TUNISIAN DELEGATION AGREED THAT EXPANSION OF UNAMIR POSED NUMEROUS PROBLEMS: WHILE AFRICAN COUNTRIES WERE READY FOR "POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT" IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN CENTRAL AFRICA, THE DELAYS IN DEPLOYMENT OF THE AFRICAN BATTALIONS FOR UNAMIR II MIGHT MILITATE AGAINST A SIMILAR APPROACH FOR ZAIRE. BEYOND THIS, THE TUNISIANS WORRIED THAT UNAMIR INVOLVEMENT BEYOND RWANDA'S BORDERS, PARTICULARLY IN THE VOLATILE CAMPS IN EASTERN ZAIRE, MIGHT DAMAGE THE OPERATION'S CREDIBILITY INSIDE RWANDA.

GERMANY: "WHAT ARE OUR INTERESTS?"

12. THE GERMANS, WHO HAD REMAINED SILENT DURING THE INITIAL DISCUSSIONS, OFFERED THEIR PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN EASTERN ZAIRE. AMBASSADOR HARALD GANNS, THE GERMAN MFA DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, ASKED THE SESSION TO EXAMINE "WHAT ARE OUR INTERESTS" IN EASTERN ZAIRE? GANNS SUGGESTED THAT, FOR GERMANY, THE SECURITY OF ITS NATIONALS WORKING IN THE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT WAS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE REFUGEES WILL BE ENCAMPED IN ZAIRE FOR SOME TIME, AND SHOULD ACT ACCORDINGLY. GANNS SAID THAT EVEN A SMALL FORCE TO ACCOMPANY AID WORKERS INTO THE CAMPS TO ASSURE

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DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF SUPPLIES WOULD BE IN THE
CONFIDENCE OF THE NGOS. THE GERMANS AGREED THAT THE
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SECURITY ISSUE MUST BE LINKED TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
AND REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES, BUT THAT WHILE THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WISHED TO ACT, IT SEEMED
SKEPTICAL OF ALL PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE. GANNS WARNED
THAT IF A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE ENTERED THE CAMPS, THE
ENTIRE POPULATION WOULD RESIST, AND THERE COULD BE A
BLOODY WAR. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WAS
UNDERSTANDABLE THAT NO COUNTRIES WISHED TO COMMIT TROOPS.

13. GANNS CONTINUED THAT, UNSAVORY AS IT MAY SEEM,
GERMANY AGREED WITH THE SYG'S RECOMMENDATION THAT A THERE
MUST BE A DIALOG BETWEEN THE GOR AND THE LEADERS IN
EXILE. IT WAS CERTAIN THAT KAGAME WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS
SUGGESTION, AND GERMANY BELIEVED THAT THERE MUST BE AN
END TO "THIS CULTURE OF IMPUNITY." THAT SAID, IF THE
ALTERNATIVE WAS A BLOODY WAR BETWEEN AN INTERNATIONAL
PEACEKEEPING FORCE AND THE REFUGEES, A DIALOG MIGHT BE
ONE OF THE LEAST OBJECTIONABLE OPTIONS. AT THE SAME
TIME, THE GERMANS SUPPORTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
MINIMUM OF SECURITY FOR THE NGOS WORKING IN THE CAMPS,
PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF FOOD DISTRIBUTION, AND THE
NEED TO CREATE CONDITIONS WITHIN RWANDA WHICH WOULD
ENCOURAGE REFUGEES TO RETURN.

SWEDEN AND JAPAN RESPOND

14. THE SWEDISH DELEGATION GENTLY SUGGESTED THAT "OUR
INTERESTS" IN THE REGION LIE IN HELPING TO REPAIR THE
DAMAGE TO AFRICA BY WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN RWANDA.

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AMBASSADOR ANDERS OLJELUND, MFA DEPUTY POLITICAL
DIRECTOR, WARNED THAT DONOR FATIGUE WAS DANGEROUS FOR
AFRICA, AND THAT THE INSECURITY WHICH REIGNED IN THE
CAMPS IN EASTERN ZAIRE MUST NOT BE PERMITTED TO MOVE INTO
RWANDA. OLJELUND SAID THAT BEST WAY TO DEMONSTRATE TO
OUR OWN PEOPLE THAT WE ARE MOVING TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS
WAS TO ENCOURAGE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA AND
REPATRIATION OF THE REFUGEES. OLJELUND ADDED THAT THE
GOR MUST BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE LARGE NUMBERS OF

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RETURNES, AND THAT OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION MUST BE
BROUGHT INTO THE PROCESS. UNCLASSIFIED

15. SHUNJI MARUYAMA, JAPAN'S DEPUTY PERMREP AT THE UN,
NOTED HIS GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN WITH THE SECURITY
SITUATION IN THE CAMPS, BUT SAID THAT JAPAN WAS NOT IN A
POSITION TO PROPOSE A PREFERRED OPTION. MARUYAMA SAID
THAT THERE WERE ONGOING TALKS IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THIS ISSUE, AND IT APPEARED THAT THE "FRIENDS OF
RWANDA" FORUM DUPLICATED THESE DISCUSSIONS.

WIRTH ON PRIVATE CONTRACTORS

16. AT THIS POINT, UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH NOTED U.S.
INTEREST IN PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS THE SECURITY PROBLEM
WITH PRIVATE CONTRACTORS, NOTING THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS
NOT INCLUDED IN THE SYG'S REPORT. U/SYG HANSEN REPLIED
THAT THIS WAS NOT A "PREFERRED OPTION," BUT THAT
"TECHNICAL CONSIDERATION" OF THE PROPOSAL WAS UNDERWAY.
WIRTH PRESSED HANSEN FOR AN ESTIMATE OF THE COST,
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LOGISTICS, AND AN ASSESSMENT OF WHO MIGHT BE AVAILABLE,
BUT THE UN REPRESENTATIVES COULD PROVIDE NO DETAILS.
MAJOR GENERAL BARIL ADMITTED THAT A UN TEAM WAS NOW IN
GOMA TO ASSESS THIS OPTION, BUT THAT THE REPORT MUST BE
SUBMITTED TO THE SYG BEFORE SHARING WITH MEMBER STATES.
BARIL SHARED HANSEN'S VIEW ON THE VIABILITY OF THIS
OPTION, AND ADDED THAT "THE UN HAS NEVER DONE THIS
BEFORE," AND TERMED IT A "FALL-BACK POSITION."

17. WIRTH REITERATED U.S. INTEREST IN THE PRIVATE
SECURITY OPTION, AND NOTED THAT THE PEACEKEEPING
PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE SYG'S REPORT SEEMED "DIFFICULT
TO UNREALISTIC." WIRTH ADDED THAT HE WAS ALSO INTRIGUED
BY THE BELGIAN APPROACH TO BEGIN IN BURUNDI, NOTING THAT
"SUCCESS BREEDS SUCCESS."

ROLE OF UNAMIR

18. THE UN DELEGATION REPORTED THAT WITHIN TWO TO THREE
WEEKS, UNAMIR WILL AT LAST BE FULLY DEPLOYED TO ITS
AUTHORIZED STRENGTH. BARIL SAID THAT HE EXPECTED A
RESOLUTION NEXT WEEK TO EXTEND UNAMIR'S MANDATE. THE

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BELGIANS SUGGESTED THAT UNAMIR SHOULD CONTINUE IN PLACE, BUT THAT THE MANDATE SHOULD PERMIT THE FORCE TO CONCENTRATE ON IMPROVING CONDITIONS FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES. FURTHER, THE BELGIANS URGED THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO REVIEW THE MANDATE WITH AN ACCENT ON IMPROVING SECURITY IN THE VILLAGES AND RURAL AREAS. AS PART OF THE BELGIAN STRATEGY TO START WITH BURUNDI, BRUSSELS WOULD

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ALSO LIKE UNAMIR AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS TO DEPLOY IN THE SOUTH TO FACILITATE THE REPATRIATION OF RWANDAN REFUGEES FROM BURUNDI.

HANSEN SUMS UP

19. PETER HANSEN SAID THAT WHILE THE FOCUS HAD BEEN ON THE PLIGHT OF THE REFUGEES, THE SITUATION WITHIN RWANDA WAS CRITICAL. THE GOR WAS FRUSTRATED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD RESPONDED TO THE EXTERNAL CRISIS TO THE DETRIMENT OF RWANDA. HANSEN NOTED THAT 80 PERCENT OF INTERNATIONAL AID HAD GONE OUTSIDE RWANDA, WHILE ONLY 20 PERCENT HAD BEEN SPENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY. HE ADDED THAT INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS WITHIN RWANDA WERE ALMOST AS NUMEROUS AS THE REFUGEES. HANSEN WAS COGNIZENT OF THE "MORAL ANGUISH" FELT BY THE NGOS IN PROVIDING RELIEF TO PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE PARTICIPATED IN GENOCIDE, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT 90 PERCENT OF THE RWANDAN REFUGEES WERE CIVILIANS (MAINLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN). HANSEN CONCLUDED THAT WE DO NOT WANT "ALL OR NOTHING SOLUTIONS."

END TEXT.

7. REGARDS.

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